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Introduction 
Radical right parties (RRPs) have become successful political actors in many Western 
democracies. Several theories explain their success with a growing group of people who feel 
‘left behind’ in the processes of globalisation and economic modernisation over the past several 
decades (Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008). Feeling threatened by increasing economic, 
cultural and political openness, they sympathize with RRPs that promise to put the nation and 
its people first. Income inequality can be treated as a summary indicator for the social and 
economic divides following the structural macroeconomic developments in advanced 
democracies, but only few studies take into account the role of income inequality for radical 
right support (Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler 2009; Han 2016; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018; 
Burgoon et al. 2019; Engler and Weisstanner 2020). Moreover, the link between income 
inequality as a macro-level indicator and electoral outcomes is complex; there are several 
possible ways how changes in inequality affect different voters at the individual level, 
depending on their position in society or their income, and how this in turn might influence 
their voting behaviour. Some evidence suggests that income inequality may have an impact not 
only through material self-interest but also through feelings of social marginalization (Gidron 
and Hall 2019), yet there is no theoretical framework combining these different impacts of 
inequality on voting. In this paper, we address this gap by examining how the long-term trend 
towards rising income inequality affects support for RRPs among different voter groups. 
We argue that rising income inequality is an important indicator not only of the extent to 
which some groups have fallen behind compared to others, but also of the potential decline in 
society that people higher up in the social hierarchy could face. The first logic is based on 
‘relative deprivation’ theories (Runciman 1966) and implies that low-income groups, the main 
losers of rising inequality, become more likely to support RRPs in societies that grow more 
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unequal over time. The second logic is premised upon risk theories (Moene and Wallerstein 
2001; Rehm 2016) and maintains that middle-income individuals face potentially large income 
losses in unequal societies and turn to RRPs, which promise to address anxieties about decline 
by opposing globalisation and open labour markets. The second hypothesis has received 
attention in recent studies showing that not actual labour market disadvantage but the 
threatening decline of those who still have income and prestige to lose explains support for the 
radical right (Rovny and Rovny 2017; Kurer forthcoming; Kurer and Palier 2019; Im et al. 
2019). 
Following Gidron and Hall (2017, 2019), we stay out of the debate about whether the rise 
of the radical right is rooted in economic or cultural changes; we argue that income inequality 
not only worsens the relative position of the less well-off in material terms but also their 
perceived social status. Subjective social status, defined as the ‘level of social respect or esteem 
people believe is accorded them within the social order’ (Gidron and Hall 2017, S61), is key 
in understanding how difficult economic circumstances lead to support for a party family that 
puts most emphasis on cultural, rather than economic issues (Mudde 2007). Without 
considering social status, RRPs, just like their radical left counterparts, are simply an 
alternative to mainstream parties because of their outsider status, anti-establishment claims and 
opposition to international trade and globalisation that might attract voters dissatisfied with 
their personal financial situation (Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018). When subjective social status 
is taken into account, the radical right becomes much more attractive because of its claims to 
restore the dignity of those left behind by cultivating nativism and therewith providing non-
economic criteria of social status (Lipset 1959; Gidron and Hall 2017; Gest, Reny, and Mayer 
2018). 
The ‘relative deprivation’ logic leads us to expect that low-income and low-status 
individuals become more likely to support RRPs in societies that grow more unequal. In 
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contrast, following the ‘threat of social decline’ logic, we hypothesize that individuals higher 
up in the income and status hierarchy support the radical right as inequality increases and these 
individuals fear the possibility of a steep social decline. We test both claims using an 
encompassing individual-level dataset from the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP), comparing 14 OECD countries between 1987 and 2017. We find that rising income 
inequality increases the likelihood of RRP support and that this effect is most pronounced 
among individuals with high subjective social status and lower-middle incomes. In increasingly 
unequal societies, therefore, anxieties about social decline seem to matter more for RRP choice 
than does actual deprivation. Threats of decline are especially relevant with respect to 
subjective social status, which emerges as a crucial link between structural economic changes 
and the non-economic stances of RRPs. However, unlike Gidron and Hall (2017, 2019) we find 
that in societies that have grown more unequal, the radical right has a substantial electoral 
potential among high-status individuals, not among those whose subjective status has declined 
the most. For the most deprived groups with lowest social status, income inequality is more 
plausibly associated with radical left party support, which promote strongly redistributive 
platforms (Rooduijn et al. 2017; Burgoon et al. 2019). Yet for voters higher up in the social 
hierarchy, supporting RRPs could be seen as a reaction to perceived threats of decline from 
widening social hierarchies associated with rising income inequality. 
We proceed as follows. The next section presents our theoretical framework, 
conceptualising the impact of income inequality for different income and status groups at the 
individual level, based on two theories: relative deprivation and the threat of social decline. We 





We develop our argument in two steps. Building on existing literature, we argue that support 
for radical right parties is related to two individual-level indicators for social stratification: 
income and subjective social status. Our own theoretical contribution then highlights how the 
context of rising income inequality affects the association between these socio-economic 
indicators and radical right support. We derive one set of hypotheses based on the ‘relative 
deprivation’ logic and another based on a ‘threat of social decline’ logic. 
Income, social status and radical right voting 
Radical right parties are characterized by their anti-establishment discourse, authoritarian 
values and nativist ideology (Mudde 2007). Because these parties strongly emphasise cultural 
issues, rising income inequality might not affect voters in purely economic terms  (Inglehart 
and Norris 2017). We know that RRP voters are distinct not only in their underlying socio-
economic profiles (Rooduijn et al. 2017; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018), but also in how they 
perceive their social status (Lipset 1959; Gidron and Hall 2017, 2019). Both socio-economic 
characteristics and social status are important indicators of social stratification, and closely 
connected to inequality trends: Rising income inequality implies that the gap between different 
income groups increases. Moreover, rising inequality also changes the social status hierarchy 
in society (Ridgeway 2014; Gidron and Hall 2019). Our theoretical framework disentangles 
the impact of income inequality on RRP support at the individual level for different income 
and status groups. Before formulating hypotheses about rising inequality, we summarize 
existing research showing higher RRP support among both low-income and low status groups. 
Many studies show that income is associated with voting for RRPs (Lubbers, Gijsberts, 
and Scheepers 2002; Rooduijn et al. 2017; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018; Burgoon et al. 2019). 
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Although the effect seems weaker compared to other socio-economic characteristics like 
education, class or unemployment (Kriesi et al. 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi 2013), there are 
several theoretical mechanisms linking low income to RRP support. Those at the bottom of the 
income distribution use retrospective voting to punish mainstream parties and turn to RRPs, 
which present themselves as outsiders using anti-establishment rhetoric (Betz 1993; Bergh 
2004). Additionally, the RRPs’ nativism speaks to low-income workers who think that 
immigration and trade flows pose a stronger threat to their earnings. Thus, we assume a 
negative association between income and RRP support. 
However, following Gidron and Hall (2017, 2019), we do not think that the rise of RRPs 
should be discussed in a solely economic framework. RRPs mainly politicise issues on the 
cultural dimension (Kriesi et al. 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi 2013). Therefore, another 
criterion of social stratification becomes important to understand how economic changes 
translate into support for RRPs: subjective social status. Max Weber (1968) famously 
distinguished social status as a form of stratification separate from class. Defined as a ‘person’s 
position within a hierarchy of social prestige’ (Gidron and Hall 2017, S61), social status 
correlates with income or class, but is a conceptually distinct form of stratification, varying 
within income  groups (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007).1 There is also a clear link between income 
inequality and social status. As higher income inequality indicates steeper hierarchies in 
society, status differences become more pronounced in unequal societies (Ridgeway 2014; 
Layte and Whelan 2014; Wilkinson and Pickett 2018). When testing whether persons feeling 
‘left behind’ are more likely to vote for RRPs independent from their actual income, we need 
to consider subjective social status in addition to income.  
According to Gidron and Hall (2017) and going back to the ‘status politics’ thesis by Lipset 
(1959), subjective social status is key in understanding support for the radical right. While poor 
personal economic conditions can lead people to support both the radical right and the radical 
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left (Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018), those experiencing a decline in subjective social status are 
more likely to respond to the appeals of RRPs. The radical right promises to restore the status 
of those feeling left behind and provides a criterion of status – being native – that is independent 
from economic prosperity. Gidron and Hall (2017, 2019) provide comparative empirical 
evidence for the claim that the decreasing subjective status of low-educated men correlates 
with support for RRPs. Furthermore, lower status is associated with holding authoritarian 
values that are prominently promoted by RRPs (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007; Bornschier 2010). 
Hence, we also assume a negative association between subjective social status and RRP 
support. 
In sum, previous studies show that two important features of stratification – income and 
social status – matter for RRP voting. This paper aims to understand how the macroeconomic 
trend towards rising income inequality influences the effect of these individual-level features.2 
We expect that increasing income inequality reinforces the effects of income and social status 
for two reasons. First, following relative deprivation theory, low-income and low-status 
individuals might support RRPs when their position deteriorates in relative terms. Second, 
higher income inequality increases the potential decline of higher-income and higher-status 
groups, who might support RRPs for fear of social decline. Thus, how income inequality affects 
RRP voting depends on whether the actual status and income position, the fear of decline, or 
both, matters.  
Income inequality and relative deprivation 
Our first mechanisms is based on relative deprivation theory (Runciman 1966). It argues that 
individuals with low relative incomes might feel deprived compared to individuals who are 
relatively better off – irrespective of absolute income levels and consumption possibilities 
(Hastings 2019). Rising income inequality implies a larger number of people who are left 
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behind in relative terms. Although the structure of inequality differs across countries (Lupu 
and Pontusson 2011), rising inequality always increases the distance between poor and better-
off individuals, and so leaves low-income individuals in a state of higher relative deprivation 
compared to middle- and top-income groups. Many studies show that relative deprivation 
invokes feelings of angry resentment at being less well-off than one deserves (Pettigrew 2016), 
which in turn makes the RRP’s cultural positions attractive (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012; 
Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016). This leads to our first deprivation hypothesis: 
H1a: As inequality increases, the likelihood of low-income respondents to support RRPs 
increases. 
As discussed above, the consequences of inequality may go beyond increasing income 
disparities and extend to other indicators of social stratification. Rising income inequality has 
been found to magnify disparities in social status perceptions, as inequality affects the 
hierarchy among individuals who are more or less esteemed in society (Pichler and Wallace 
2009; Ridgeway 2014; Paskov, Gërxhani, and van de Werfhorst 2017; Wilkinson and Pickett 
2018). Rising inequality is also associated with status decline, particularly among low-income 
groups (Lindemann and Saar 2014; Gidron and Hall 2019). In the framework of relative 
deprivation, we expect that as inequality increases and status disparities grow, those with the 
lowest status levels feel even more deprived compared to individuals with higher status levels. 
Given rising inequality, deprived individuals with a sense of low social status are likely to find 
an alternative in RRPs who promise to restore their lost sense of social identity (Spruyt, 
Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016; Gidron and Hall 2019). 




Income inequality and threat of social decline 
Our second theoretical channel focuses on the threat of social decline, rather than actual 
deprivation. Major literature strands recently cast doubt on the role of material and social 
deprivation in explaining RRP support (Oesch 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Kurer and 
Palier 2019). While these critiques do not refute economic explanations of RRP voting per se, 
they point to missing dynamics in deprivation-based theories: Few studies consider the 
possibility of a future decline in material and non-material conditions. We argue that based on 
risk theories, even individuals with higher incomes and status can feel threatened by social 
decline if income inequality increases the extent of the potential downfall. RRPs could then 
benefit from these anxieties associated with the threat of social decline. 
In principle, rising income inequality implies larger potential income losses for high-
income groups, as the gap between upper and lower parts of the distribution increases. 
However, risk is not equally distributed across income groups: the probability of income losses 
decreases as income rises (Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012). Therefore, demand for 
insurance against economic risk becomes a powerful motivation among higher-income groups 
facing large potential losses (see e.g. Iversen and Soskice 2001; Moene and Wallerstein 2001; 
Rehm 2016). The implication of combining risk and potential income loss is that middle-
income groups are unique in being exposed to large potential income losses and high 
probabilities of income loss. Hence, the threat of income decline is likely to be especially 
pervasive among middle-income individuals since their position brings together these two 
vulnerabilities.  
Recent labour market changes further support the claim that threats of income decline 
particularly concern middle-income groups. Western democracies have witnessed widespread 
‘job polarisation’ with a decline in medium-skilled jobs as technological change replaces 
labour in routine tasks (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003). These structural changes, along with 
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increasing inequality, generate insecurities and a sense of endangerment among workers in the 
middle of the skills and income distributions (Mau 2015). Unlike their radical left counterparts, 
who traditionally turn to the welfare state to respond to economic insecurity, RRPs subsume 
these perceived threats of decline into a broader framework of opposition to globalisation and 
open labour markets (Kriesi et al. 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Kurer and Palier 2019). 
This leads to our ‘threat of social decline’ hypothesis with respect to income: 
H2a: As inequality increases, the likelihood of middle-income respondents to support 
RRPs increases. 
A similar ‘threat of decline’ mechanism applies to individuals’ subjective social status. While 
empirical research shows that rising inequality affects status levels, it appears that inequality 
reduces status levels relatively uniformly across different groups (Layte and Whelan 2014; 
Lindemann and Saar 2014; Gidron and Hall 2019). Given these effects of inequality on the 
status hierarchy among both low- and high-status groups, we expect that individuals higher up 
in the status hierarchy become particularly concerned about a potential loss of status. One 
reason for this is ‘last place aversion’ (Kuziemko et al. 2014). When it comes to subjective 
perceptions of one’s position in a hierarchy, most people want to avoid falling to the bottom. 
Moreover, a high status does not necessarily make individuals less likely to experience a 
decline in their status. In contrast to the risk of income loss, there is no objective risk function 
for subjective social status loss. Although social status correlates with income and class, it is 
an independent dimension of social stratification (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007) and the feeling 
of status decline might affect many different groups in society. As income inequality increases, 
the perceived threat of status decline gains importance for high-status individuals. 
Our predictions are in line with Gidron and Hall’s argument that people ‘a few rungs up’ 
the status hierarchy are most likely to be worried about status decline (Gidron and Hall 2017, 
S66). Status anxiety could even affect people with the highest status levels, because subjective 
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status decline is not closely associated with objective risk. Hence, as income inequality 
increases, groups with middle and high status might be threatened by the concomitant increases 
in status disparities and drawn to RRPs that offer to protect traditional social boundaries. This 
leads to our ‘threat of social decline’ hypothesis for subjective social status: 
H2b: As inequality increases, the likelihood of middle- and high-status respondents to 
support RRPs increases. 
In sum, our hypotheses generate predictions about the groups most likely to shift their support 
towards RRPs as income inequality increases. If the logic of relative deprivation applies, low-
income and low-status individuals are drawn to RRPs because they are the main losers of rising 
inequality, as these groups have experienced actual deterioration in their income and status 
position. If, in contrast, the logic of threat of social decline applies, rising inequality would 
create income and status anxieties among individuals higher up the distribution, who then turn 
to RRPs to defend their position in the income and status hierarchy. Based on the anti-
establishment nature of RRPs and their cultural emphasis on restoring or defending existing 
social boundaries, both mechanisms could apply at the same time. The effect of income 
inequality could also depend on the combination of status and income group;  thus we also test 
the hypotheses with a three-way interaction model. 
It is important to consider that in the relative deprivation logic, RRPs are not the only or 
even the most obvious electoral option. Many studies show that the most deprived individuals 
– for example, unemployed or precariously employed workers – find a valuable alternative in 
the radical left or simply abstain from voting (Emmenegger, Marx, and Schraff 2015; Rovny 
and Rovny 2017; Hooghe and Marks 2018). Since in this paper we focus on RRPs, we are 
unable to test the implications of our argument for support for the radical left and vote 
abstention. Hence, our hypotheses are not a full test of relative deprivation and threat of decline 
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theories, but rather probe how well these theories explain RRP support in different 
macroeconomic contexts. 
Data 
To test our hypotheses in cross-national perspective, we rely on data from the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) between 1987 to 2017. This significantly expands the time 
period covered by related studies using the European Social Survey from 2002 onwards 
(Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018; Burgoon et al. 2019), and allows us exploring the broader picture 
of RRP voting since income inequality started rising in many OECD countries in the 1980s. 
We selected advanced capitalist democracies in which survey respondents could choose a RRP. 
We excluded Eastern European countries, where inequality is closely linked with the transition 
to the market economy and not easily comparable with the transformations in Western 
democracies. Our final dataset consists of 14 OECD countries, 151 country-years, and 158,454 
individuals for the period from 1987 to 2017.3  
Radical right support 
The dependent variable is a respondent’s support for a radical right party (RRP) measured as 
a binary variable (RRP=1, non-RRP=0). The ISSP contains two variables that we use for RRP 
support. A first question asks which party the respondent has voted for in the last election. A 
second question asks about vote intention/general support (labelled party affiliation). We 
combine these two variables, replacing party vote with party affiliation when party vote is 
missing.4 We define RRPs following Mudde (2007, 22f.) as parties that promote a nativist and 
authoritarian political platform combined with a populist discourse dividing the society into 
‘the corrupt elite’ and ‘the pure people’.5  
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Income 
Income is measured as household income. To make the ISSP’s interval categories comparable 
across countries and time, we assign midpoints to each income bracket and follow the approach 
in Donnelly and Pop-Eleches (2018) for the top category. Next, we account for differences in 
household size, dividing income by the square root of the number of household members. 
Finally, we generate five income quintiles from these harmonized income data. The quintiles 
group respondents into five equal-sized categories of income rank and allow us distinguishing 
non-linear differences among low-, lower-middle-, middle-, upper-middle- and top-income 
groups. 
Income inequality 
Income inequality is measured at the macro-level, using Gini indicators from the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2016). Our inequality measures are based 
on market household income (before taxes and transfers). Relying on disposable income (e.g. 
Burgoon et al. 2019) assumes that individuals derive the same value for income from the labour 
market and public transfer income. Instead, we have reasons to expect that compensation by 
government transfers may not fully offset the feelings of deprivation and social marginalisation 
if people lose their labour market income, mainly because individuals attach strong societal 
value from their occupations (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). We use short-run, medium-run and 
long-run measures of income inequality trends, assessing the change in the market income Gini 
across a four-year, eight-year and twelve-year window. All three measures are coded such as 
to reduce single-year fluctuations.6 We anticipate that the long-run measure best captures 
structural long-run increases in inequality and is least influenced by cyclical swings in 
macroeconomic upturns and downturns (Pontusson and Weisstanner 2018). 
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Subjective social status 
Subjective social status is measured with the top-bottom self-placement item in the ISSP, where 
respondents indicate their position in society on a scale from 1 (bottom) to 10 (top). The 
original wording of the question is as follows: In our society, there are groups which tend to 
be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs 
from the top to the bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale? This ‘social ladder’ 
question has been validated and extensively used in existing research (Gidron and Hall 2017; 
Lindemann and Saar 2014). 
Control variables 
Within the data limits in the ISSP, we include a set of individual-level control variables: age 
(in years) and binary variables for education (tertiary education=1), gender (male=1) and 
unemployment (unemployed=1). We control for social class using the scheme by Oesch (2006). 
Finally, our models add a linear time trend, as explained in the model specification below. The 
main models do not include other potentially important contextual variables – immigration, 
trade openness, unemployment, GDP growth or welfare state expenditure – since neither was 
statistically significant and they do not substantively alter our findings (Online Appendix 4). 
Importantly, the results hardly change if we include immigration as a macro-level variable; we 
can reject the possibility that the conditional effects of inequality actually pick up the effects 
of immigration. 
Methods 
The empirical analysis is based on logistic regression models of whether a respondent supports 
an RRP, measured as a binary variable (RRP=1, non-RRP=0). Most of our models exclude 
respondents voting for radical left parties or abstaining.7 This is the default strategy in previous 
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research on radical parties (Rooduijn et al. 2017; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018), because the 
similar underlying socio-economic determinants of RRP support, radical left support and vote 
abstention would cancel each other out. Additional models that include radical left and 
abstention in the reference category indeed show that the explanatory power of socio-economic 
variables is weaker in these models since low socio-economic resources also tend to benefit 
the radical left and vote abstention. However, our main results are not affected by this decision 
(see Online Appendix 3). 
To account for heterogeneity between countries (not explained by our model), we include 
country fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by country. The inclusion of fixed 
effects has both methodological and substantive reasons: Fixed effects ensure that our models 
indeed pick up changes over time (within-country changes) and they are necessary because we 
are unable to control for various other factors that likely account for RRP strength (e.g. supply-
side factors). As both income inequality and RRP support seem to share an upward trend over 
time in many countries, we follow Kuhn et al. (2016) and add a time counter (measured in 
years, 1987=1) to account for this trend.8 Online Appendix 3 shows that our results are not 
influenced by these methodological choices and are robust to a variety of alternative 
specifications.9 
Findings 
Table 1 presents average marginal effects from our main logistic regression models of RRP 
support. Model 1 shows RRP support compared to all other vote choices (including radical left 
and abstaining), while Models 2-5 exclude all respondents supporting the radical left or 
abstaining. The models reveal that both income and status explain differences in RRP voting, 
but both effects are not overly strong. Partly against our expectations of a negative association 
between income and RRP support, we find a non-linear effect of income. The probability for 
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RRP support is significantly higher among the lower-middle income quintile compared to the 
bottom quintile. Even the middle quintile tends to have a higher propensity of RRP support 
than the lowest income group, although the difference is not statistically significant. In 
substantive terms, the effects of income are modest. The probability for RRP support differs 
by only 0.99 percentage points between the most supportive income group (lower-middle 
quintile) and the least supportive income group (top quintile) in Model 1. These effects pale 
compared to education (3.32 percentage point difference between tertiary and non-tertiary 
educated respondents) or social class (4.24 percentage points difference between socio-cultural 
professionals and production workers). 
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Table 1: Logistic regressions of radical right voting 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Income quintile (reference: 
bottom) 
     
   Lower-middle 0.58**  (0.23) 0.57**   (0.23) 0.57**   (0.23) 0.56**   (0.23) 0.55**   (0.23) 
   Middle income 0.27      (0.19) 0.03       (0.20) 0.03       (0.20) 0.02       (0.20) 0.00       (0.19) 
   Upper-middle -0.09      (0.23) -0.46       (0.32) -0.45       (0.32) -0.45       (0.32) -0.46       (0.32) 
   Top -0.41      (0.30) -0.82**   (0.40) -0.81**   (0.40) -0.83**   (0.40) -0.83**   (0.40) 
      
Subjective social status -0.06      (0.09) -0.23**   (0.11) -0.24**   (0.10) -0.23**   (0.10) -0.25*** (0.07) 
      
ΔGini market short-term   -0.51       (0.42)   
ΔGini market medium-term    0.48**   (0.21)  
ΔGini market long-term     1.12*** (0.35) 
      
Tertiary education -3.32*** (0.42) -3.82*** (0.49) -3.82*** (0.49) -3.86*** (0.46) -3.83*** (0.36) 
Class (reference: self-employed)      
   Technicians -0.50       (0.44) -0.49       (0.50) -0.48       (0.49) -0.48       (0.50) -0.41       (0.48) 
   Production workers 1.51*** (0.58) 2.20*** (0.70) 2.19*** (0.69) 2.19*** (0.70) 2.20*** (0.71) 
   Managers -1.12*** (0.31) -1.33*** (0.37) -1.34*** (0.36) -1.32*** (0.37) -1.29*** (0.35) 
   Clerks -0.40       (0.38) -0.32       (0.48) -0.32       (0.48) -0.33       (0.48) -0.34       (0.46) 
   Socio-cultural professionals -2.73*** (0.37) -2.92*** (0.43) -2.92*** (0.43) -2.90*** (0.43) -2.84*** (0.41) 
   Service workers 1.03*     (0.58) 1.64**   (0.68) 1.62**   (0.68) 1.63**   (0.68) 1.58**   (0.70) 
Age -0.00       (0.01) -0.03       (0.02) -0.03       (0.02) -0.03       (0.02) -0.03       (0.02) 
Male 2.40*** (0.16) 2.75*** (0.22) 2.75*** (0.22) 2.75*** (0.23) 2.73*** (0.24) 
Unemployed 0.35       (0.47) 0.84       (0.58) 0.85       (0.60) 0.82       (0.56) 0.80       (0.54) 
Time-trend 0.27**   (0.11) 0.29**   (0.14) 0.29**   (0.14) 0.31**   (0.13) 0.38*** (0.10) 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes Yes yes 
Abstain & radical left excluded no yes yes Yes yes 
N individuals 158,454 129,694 129,694 129,694 129,694 
N countries/country-years 14/151 14/151 14/151 14/151 14/151 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Numbers are average marginal effects, indicating the percentage point 
change in RRP voting probability. Based on logistic regression models with country fixed effects. Country-
clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
We find a significant negative effect of subjective social status on RRP support (as expected 
theoretically), but only in the models that exclude the options to vote radical left or abstain. 
The effect of subjective social status is also rather modest. In Model 1, the probability of RRP 
support only increases by 0.51 percentage points when switching from lowest to highest status. 
These small effect sizes for income and status are not surprising given that the reference 
category in Model 1 includes radical left supporters and abstaining voters, i.e. electorates with 
lower incomes and lower subjective social status. Unsurprisingly, the substantive significance 
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of the effects of income and subjective social status increase when excluding radical left voters 
and abstainers from the sample in Model 2. 
The remaining Models 3-5 introduce our measures for income inequality trends in the 
short-, medium- and long-run. Changes in income inequality turn out to increase the individual 
probability to support RRPs, but only in the medium and long run. This is consistent with our 
assumption that the latter indicate structural trends towards rising inequality, while short-term 
changes (measured over a four-year period) contain some cyclical variation and might be 
reversed. Short-run inequality changes are not statistically significantly related to RRP support 
and even have a negative sign. In contrast, inequality changes measured over an 8-year or 12-
year period significantly increase the likelihood for RRP support. The long-run effect of 
inequality (Model 5) is large in substantive terms; a change from one standard deviation below 
the mean to one above the mean increases the predicted probability for RRP support by more 
than 3 percentage points. It should be noted that all other explanatory variables remain 
unchanged by including the inequality variables.  
This baseline effect of inequality is difficult to interpret as evidence for our theoretical 
approaches, because inequality as a macro-level indicator comprises both winners and losers 
of stratification. Therefore, we move on to explore how the effect of inequality trends varies 
among different income and status groups.  
Figure 1 presents predicted probabilities from interaction models between inequality and 
income quintiles (see Online Appendix 2 for the full results). The relative deprivation 
mechanism predicts a stronger effect of income inequality among low-income groups who 
experience a relative deterioration of their financial situation as inequality increases (H1a). If 
the threat mechanism is true, we should observe a stronger effect of rising income inequality 
among middle-income quintiles (H2a). The interaction terms are jointly significant at the 99 
percent level for medium- and long-run inequality trends and not significant for short-run Gini 
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changes. To reveal more about the conditional relationships, we present predicted probability 
plots with 95 percent confidence intervals. We find that rising income inequality in the 
medium-run and especially in the long-run significantly increases the probability of RRP 
support for any income group. The right-hand panel of Figure 1 illustrates that rising market 
inequality one standard deviation above the mean (an increase of 2.8 Gini points over the 12-
year window) has a slightly stronger effect on lower-middle, middle and top-income quintiles. 
However, the inequality effect does not differ statistically significantly between the income 
groups. Figure 1 bears out a clear pattern that rising inequality in the long-term significantly 
increases RRP support for all income groups – both the winners and losers – which could be 
consistent with both theoretical mechanisms that we proposed, namely the deprivation and the 
threat mechanism. Only the rising support among the top income group remains puzzling and 
contradicts both expected mechanisms.  
Figure 1: Inequality and radical right support (by income quintile) 
 
Note: Δ Gini values = mean plus/minus one standard deviation. Full model: Online Appendix 2. 
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In Figure 2, we estimate an interaction term between inequality trends and subjective social 
status (SSS). We would expect rising RRP support among respondents with low SSS according 
to the relative deprivation theory (H1b), and rising RRP support among mid- and high-status 
respondents if the threat of social decline outweighs actual low status (H2b).  The interaction 
terms of inequality changes and SSS are on the borderline of statistical significance (p=0.103 
in the short-run, p=0.028 in the medium-run, p=0.226 in the long-run). However, the graphical 
inspection of the conditional effects in Figure 2 reveals telling patterns. Under rising inequality 
(in the short-, medium- or long-run), the likelihood to support RRPs increases more strongly 
among respondents with higher subjective social status. Furthermore, inequality trends affect 
the relationship between SSS and RRP support. Where inequality did not rise, subjective social 
status is statistically significant and negatively associated with RRP support. Rising inequality 
reverses this trend. Where inequality rose at above-average levels, the relationship between 
SSS and RRP support disappears. In other words, inequality increases RRP support more 
strongly among high-status respondents than among low-status respondents. This finding 
corroborates the claim that not those at the bottom tend to support RRP when inequality rises, 
but those that still have a higher position in society they fear to lose.  
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Figure 2: Inequality and radical right support (by subjective status) 
 
Note: Δ Gini values = mean plus/minus one standard deviation. Full model: Online Appendix 2. 
 
This is also confirmed when looking at the effects of inequality trends conditional on both 
income and subjective social status (SSS), based on three-way interaction models. Figure 3 
estimates the conditional effect of inequality changes for each income quintile separately for 
representative values of ‘low status’ (4) and ‘high status’ (8). As in the previous models, we 
find that rising income inequality in the long-term perspective increases the likelihood of RRP 
support among all income groups. Other than we would expect from the relative deprivation 
theory, in a context of rising inequality, the largest increase in RRP support derives from 
individuals whose subjective social status is high and that do not belong to the lowest income 
group. Among those with high SSS, individuals in the lower-middle and middle income 
quintiles stand out to have the highest probability of RRP support as inequality increases. 
Lower-middle income groups with high status perceptions are hardly individuals that count 
themselves to the group of people that already experienced social decline. The rising likelihood 
of RRP voting among this group, however, suggests that they belong to the group of people 
that due to rising income inequality fear a decline in social and financial terms most.  
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Figure 3: Inequality and radical right support (by income and subjective status 
interacted) 
 Δ Gini market Δ Gini market Δ Gini market 
 short-run medium-run long-run 
 
Note: Δ Gini values = mean plus/minus one standard deviation. Low status=4, high status=8 (representing the 
bottom and top deciles in the status distribution). Full model: Online Appendix 2. 
 
Our analysis leaves the question of how the most deprived citizens respond to rising inequality, 
given that they do not move in large numbers to RRPs, as our analysis showed. The most 
straightforward expectation is that the citizens with lowest income and status levels find a more 
valuable alternative in radical left parties (Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018). Radical left parties 
combine an anti-establishment discourse with demand for extensive state intervention and 
antipathy against market outcomes. Being at the bottom of the social hierarchy, these 
individuals would benefit from redistribution and might count on public transfers for a living. 
A full test of this argument is beyond the scope of this paper, but in Online Appendix 5 we find 
strong preliminary evidence that the deprivation mechanism is indeed more likely to apply for 
radical left parties than their RRP counterparts. Income inequality significantly increases 
radical left support, but this effect is most pronounced among low-income individuals (rather 
than middle- or high-income individuals), and radical left support is much stronger among low-
status individuals (rather than high-status individuals). These preliminary findings point to 
fruitful avenues for further research, by examining how income inequality affects multiple vote 
choices, including abstention and political alienation. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we shed light on the interplay of two recent phenomena affecting Western 
democracies: rising income inequality and the simultaneous increase in support for radical right 
parties (RRPs). Studies explaining rising RRP support over the last several decades often 
conclude that the people who feel ‘left behind’ in the processes of globalisation and economic 
modernisation are turning to RRPs. Income inequality allows us to measure to what extent 
people are left behind in relative terms. Therewith our study contributes to the debate about the 
economic sources of RRP support, whose effect, in the past, has mainly been tested in 
individual-level studies focusing on socio-economic characteristics and occupational patterns 
(Rooduijn et al. 2017; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018; Rovny and Rovny 2017). Nevertheless, 
we argue that rising income inequality does not only bear implications for the economic 
approach to RRP support. Income inequality also manifests hierarchies based on social status 
as a separate category of stratification (Ridgeway 2014). Gidron and Hall (2017, 2019) argue 
that subjective social status is an important factor in understanding how economic conditions 
translate into support for RRPs that mainly politicize the cultural dimension. By cultivating 
nativism, RRPs promise to restore the status of those ‘left behind’ and deliver voters a non-
economic source of prestige. Both income and social status have been shown to negatively 
correlate with RRP support. In this paper, we then analysed how rising inequality affects the 
probability of supporting RRPs among different income groups and status groups.  
We argued that there are two possible ways for rising income inequality to affect RRP 
support. First, rising income inequality strengthens the effect of income on RRP support 
through the logic of relative deprivation (Runciman 1966). When inequality is increasing, 
people at the lower end of the income and status hierarchy feel relatively more deprived and 
strive for change that RRPs promise in their anti-establishment claims. Second, rising income 
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inequality increases the potential ‘height of fall’ for those who fear social decline. The effect 
of rising income inequality is then less pronounced among those already ‘left behind’ and 
reaches into the ranks of those who have more left to lose – the middle-income and high-status 
groups.  
Our analyses of 14 OECD countries over the period between 1987 and 2017 confirms the 
reinforcing effect of rising income inequality on the probability of RRP voting among certain 
groups of income and status. This effect is strongest among individuals with middle incomes 
and high status. The general growth of RRP support in increasingly unequal societies should 
therefore not be traced back solely to those who have experienced an actual decline in income 
and social status. Rather, our results suggest that the voting behaviour of individuals higher up 
in the social hierarchy is even more crucial to understanding how income inequality fuels RRP 
support. We make the theoretical claim that this group is most likely to fear social decline and 
therewith turns towards RRPs. The two main thrusts of our argument are RRPs’ stance against 
globalisation, which speaks to economic insecurities of middle-income workers, and their 
discourse to provide non-economic criteria of social status that pits natives against immigrants, 
which speaks to those worried about protecting their status in the social hierarchy. In contrast, 
the RRPs’ anti-elitist stances are not enough to gain support among the most deprived voters, 
who are likely to have a material interest in more redistributive platforms than RRPs offer. To 
confirm these causal claims, future research should try to measure how income inequality 
affects the perceived anxiety of social decline among different groups in society, particularly 
the middle class, and test how this affects voting behaviour. 
These results contribute to the literature on RRP support in several ways. First, the paper 
links the debate about support for RRPs among socio-economically weak constituents with one 
significant macroeconomic change observable over the past decades and shows that increasing 
income inequality is important in explaining patterns of support. Second, the results give 
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further evidence to Gidron and Hall’s (2017, 2019) claim that RRP support is not about either 
the economy or culture. Rather, we have good reasons to believe that features of social 
hierarchies, such as subjective social status, function as an important link between economic 
well-being and support for radical parties. However, the relationship is less straightforward 
than Gidron and Hall suggest, as in our analysis, anxiety about losing subjective social status 
proves to be more important than actual decline. 
 
Notes  
1 Online Appendix 1 shows that subjective social status is significantly associated with income, 
education and class, but these factors explain only a small fraction of the variance in subjective 
social status (R2=0.24 in a fixed-effects model). 
2 We focus on short-run, medium-run and long-run inequality trends. We expect an effect of 
long-term changes, which voters are likely to notice as permanent changes of stratification. 
Short-term changes, in contrast, capture more cyclical inequality swings (Pontusson and 
Weisstanner 2018). 
3 The 14 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
4 The correlation between radical right vote and affiliation is 0.52 (N=46,223) for those cases 
where both measurements are available. Our findings are substantively unaltered if we include 
a dummy for party affiliation. 
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5 We coded parties in the ISSP using Armingeon et al. (2018), who provide an updated list of 
Mudde’s original classification and only deviate in a few (borderline) cases: the Swiss People’s 
Party (radical right from 1995 on), the Italian National Alliance, and the List Pim Fortuyn. We 
also deviate from Mudde and Armingeon et al. by classifying the Norwegian Progress Party as 
radical right, which turned from an anti-tax movement towards an anti-immigrant platform in 
the 1980s (see Oesch and Rennwald 2018, 789). 
6 The short-run trend measure is coded as: 
12∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑖1𝑖=0 − 12∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑖3𝑖=2 ; the medium-term 
measure as:  
14∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑖3𝑖=0 − 14∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑖7𝑖=4 ; and the long-term measure as: 14∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑖3𝑖=0 −14∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑖11𝑖=8 .  
7 Radical left was coded according to March (2011) as parties that criticize the market economy, 
promote strong interventionist policies and, similar to the radical right, cultivate anti-
establishment sentiments. 
8 We hasten to add that the increase in market inequality is not linear over time; inequality is 
particularly prone to jump in economic crises but can also decrease in other years (Pontusson 
and Weisstanner 2018). Hence, our results do not simply indicate a spurious relationship with 
a linear upward trend (that could be based on any unobserved variable). Our findings are 
substantively unaltered with country-specific time trends, without any time trend, or with 
quadratic or cubic polynomial time trends (see Online Appendix 3). 
9 We obtain similar results using multilevel logistic regressions, although the effects of 
inequality changes are estimated with slightly less precision. The interaction estimates, 
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